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Abstract—Collective awareness platforms (CAPs) are internet
and mobile tools for collaboration, sustainability and social
innovation that can allows drastic improvement of our lifestyle,
beyond the standard economic model. However, their develop-
ment is often driven (and motivated) by technology, while their
adoption and usage characteristics are determined by the social
interactions and can be affected by many items, up to failure.
We describe here our approach to CAPs modelling that includes
elements from cognitive and evolutionary sciences, in the hope of
providing instruments for the improvement and the assessment
of CAPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective Awareness Platforms (CAPs) are all those appli-
cations based on Internet or mobile communication that exploit
social networking for creating communities, deliver new ser-
vices, build innovative knowledge, exploiting and promoting
collective intelligence.
There are ”big” CAPs like Google, Wikipedia or Facebook,
and small ones like the myriad of free applications for mobile
phones. Indeed, many social innovations have originated as
CAPs in recent years, and with the pervasiveness of the
Internet of Things (sensors and tags embedded in every item
we use) many more application will arise.
The Collective Awareness Platforms are currently viewed
as a promising vehicle for unlocking the tremendous poten-
tial that technology-enabled, highly-connected, distributed and
participatory human beings can bring about for the benefit
of the society and the environment. However, CAPs largely
rely on the collaboration and contributions of human beings
with very different personality attributes, cognitive strategies,
and varying exposure and sensitiveness to social influence.
Their behaviours combine in different proportions (pure) al-
truism and rational selfishness (i.e., economic man), exhibit
psychological and cognitive biases, and are shaped by real and
virtual communities they participate in. Moreover, many CAP
instances need to overcome the concerns of end users about
the privacy of their data and locations; again, the intensity of
these concerns varies broadly across the (candidate) contribu-
tors. Last, but not least, CAPs usually represent a paradigm
of service provision that deviates from familiar rules and
prescriptions of market, and may stand competitively against
purely commercial alternatives. For all these reasons, their
wide adoption, sustainability, and effectiveness presents major
challenges.
Most of CAPs are not driven by profit, and this represents
in some sense the modern incarnation of the free software
movement, to be compared with the traditional market-driven
approach. For many applications of this type, the social accep-
tance (e.g., number of users, their activity) is the crucial factor
that discriminates thriving from dying. This is not implying
that the market dimension is not important: Google owes its
fortune to the mass of users that contribute (informed or not)
with a piece of knowledge either by adding a link to a web
page (e.g., page rank), or by clicking a search topic, or writing
an email in gmail and so on. A similar analysis applies to
FaceBook.
The European Union is betting on CAPs as an instrument
for sustainability and social innovation [1]. Indeed, the oppor-
tunities offered by the present communication system allows to
transform everyday life in several ways, from worse to better in
environmental terms. Differently from the US scenario, mainly
funded by charitable and profitable investments, in EU many
researches are driven by public funds.
CAPs embody one of the possible directions that the future
Internet evolution may take, strongly promoting collaboration
and social values, against more individualist approaches that
envision Internet as (yet another) field of commercial compe-
tition.
However, CAPs development is often driven by the tech-
nical aspects. Given a need (real or perceived), the develop-
ers concentrate on the development of the CAP, frequently
considering the cognitive and the social aspects (i.e., the
socio-cognitive ergonomy) as accessories to be addressed later.
This often implies the lack of community support to the
CAP and therefore its failure. Rarely the opposite happens:
a real community promoting the development of a needed
application.
We are missing the instruments for an abstract classification
and dynamical modelling of CAPs, instruments that would
allow to monitor the “healthy status” of the application, of its
reference community, eventually furnishing assessment indica-
tors. The principal ingredient of this modelling is clearly the
human factor, in terms of individual, community and society.
We shall try to list here some of the main aspects of the social
part of a CAP.
II. HUMAN DIMENSIONS
In general, people are willing and capable to adapt their
behaviour to sustainable lifestyles if the necessary feedback,
support, and incentives are provided. For instance the social
influence of the community is recognized as an important
factor in energy saving initiatives. Timely electrical consump-
tion feedback (through smart metering), is believed to reduce
domestic electrical consumption by a fraction of 5-15% [2].
Social norms can motivate people to question their behaviour,
if they discover it is not “normal” [3]. People tend to learn
from their social networks and receive encouragement and
support. Nowadays, people who are forced to cooperate to
achieve a common goal tend to form a trust between them,
influenced by their action [4]. Receiving daily feedback and
taking sustainable actions in a social context can increase
peoples effectiveness [5].
A good understanding of the mechanism that drives human
decision making in a collective awareness and participatory
environments, is a key factor for CAPs classification and
categorization.
A. Evolutionary constraints
The main point to be considered is the fact that our cogni-
tive capacities have been selected within a given environment.
Beyond the biological constraints, the main selective force that
shaped our capacities is sexual selection, in the form of access
to reproductive partners [6]. Indeed, the simple selection for
survival has little effect on a sufficiently structured society,
that is able to provide basic assistance to all members (i.e., at
least those that survive after the embryonic development), and
moreover possess such a complex structure so that different
capacities find their place.
The sexual selection surely shaped our body, as did with
almost all sexually-reproductive animals (e.g., just think to the
sexual ornaments of birds). It also shaped our brain, favouring
(selecting) all the “useless” characters (i.e., the taste for music,
dancing, art, probably our sophisticated speech abilities, and
effective social problem solving capacities). Indirectly, since
one of the main factors for reproduction is social power, it
also shaped our social (and Machiavellian) brain. In the human
society, the key for success is not the body strength, but rather
the capabilities of forming alliances and cheating others.
However, stable alliances imply trusting, and we have
several mechanisms for enforcing this aspect: the natural
tendency of revealing liars by uncontrolled gestures or displays
(e.g., blushing), the sense of loyalty and justice, the reputation
and privacy mechanisms [7]. These are the mechanisms still in
force for “modern” cooperation even in the cybernetic word.
It might be argued that sexual selection furnished the
“gross” texture, i.e., dexterity, language, sense of beauty,
metaphors, art; in a few words, our “big brain”. However, the
technological “run-out” (in analogy with the sexual run-out
that promotes the development of more and more conspicuous
ornaments) is surely due to trading [8]. The specialization
and the necessity of trusting and detecting liars, that come
with commerce and bargain, is probably the main promoter
of our “collective intelligence” [9]. In analogy with an ant
nest with its specialized casts, we are continuously developing
specialization and solving collectively optimization problems,
adding innovation through cognitive (rather than simply ge-
netic) evolution [10]. What is emerging in the present internet
world is the capability of addressing collective efforts in
developing big “operas”, that are neither driven by profit nor
sponsored by a private or public entity: just think to the Linux
kernel or to Wikipedia, or the mass of internet pages and free
apps [11]. The reputation component is surely an important
driving force in this phenomenon.
On the other hand, we (as primates) also developed a
fierce tendency to forming gangs, developing identity signs
(for instance, dialects), that allow an easy determination of
“stranger”, and hating “foreign” groups. Global love was never
a viable option.
In particular, it seems that we use different cognitive
structures for different tasks. Concepts like the bounded ra-
tionality [12], the pre-attentive mechanisms producing effects
such as the cognitive blindness [13], and the perceptive mag-
nification, seems to be properly intertwined and continuously
tuned so to concentrate our attention, making our cognitive
system effective for social problem solving and collective
decision making. Such mechanisms are presumably the reason
why special “social numbers” can be observed in humans and
primates [14], suggesting how different social structure could
have been evolved in order to solve particular tasks, by means
of particular cognitive processes.
B. Mental schemes and tri-partite model of cognition
In order to get into account the previous scenario and its
quite complex set of coupled processes and mechanisms, we
developed a dedicated model of cognitive activity (the Tri-
Partite Model [15]), explicitly devoted to the representation of
the three main aspects of the cognitive activity, the unconscious
perception mechanisms, the conscious elaboration and the
learning dynamics, so obtaining a general model with three
different sections (see Fig. 1).
The first module is related to perception and unconscious
elaboration of data from the external world. The activated
schemes filter the outside information and populate the internal
context, which may trigger the activation of further schemes.
The chains of activated schemes essentially constitute the
awareness of the node, while the sum of its entire set of
schemes represents the knowledge of the node. There are
meta-schemes that control the working of processing, avoiding
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Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the Tri-Partite model
timing is short. This first module is the fastest one and
essentially out of conscious control in humans.
The second module has to do with actions, i.e., with outputs
and reasoning, but also with emotions. It works in a way
similar to the first one, but its actions are well character-
ized by larger response times (i.e., frequently easily mea-
surable/assessable). Conflicts among schemes and regulative
actions (e.g., the resolutions of cognitive dissonance) can be
detected by reaction times.
The third module, the slowest one in terms of reaction time,
concerns the learning, simulation and planning phases. They
act by evaluating the performances of the chains of schemes
and the fulfilment of goals by optimizing the activation patterns
and scores of schemes.
This model was developed in the context of FET project
RECOGNITION [16], aiming at understanding the heuristics-
based mechanism of decision making in the presence of
incomplete information and/or a limitation of processing re-
sources. Based on this exploration, we are confident that the
proposed modular architecture has good potential in capturing,
at a sufficiently simple level, the complexities associated with
human-driven decision-making in a collective awareness and
participatory engagement environment.
In particular, we are applying this framework to the human
online communication systems. We humans developed several
modalities of exchanging information, of whom the “verbal”
content is just a part. Let simply consider how the transcript
of an interception looks uninformative and innatural, without
the nonverbal components.
When using an online communication channel (e.g., chat,
forums, email), humans are exploring new communication
media, face new challenges when taking decisions, while at
the same time they are exposed to stimuli, information and
opportunities for social interaction, altering their cognitive and
behavioural characteristics.
On the other hand, the electronic media offer an almost-
ideal experimental framework, in which it is possible to capture
almost all the communicated information, with accurate timing
and already in digital form. Our preliminary investigations
are presently devoted to establish the reference framework
(communication network structure in the presence of different
tasks) [17]. We are now designing interactive cooperative
games to explore the basic ingredients of collective intelli-
gence.
III. COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE
AWARENESS PLATFORMS
A first effort to systematically categorize and characterize
collective awareness platforms can be found in Ref. [1], and
described in Ref. [18], even if the term the authors use is
web-enabled Collective Intelligence (CI). It draws on a study
of 250 examples of web-enabled CI, carried out in the context
of a broader initiative on collective intelligence at MIT. They
propose four fundamental attributes for abstracting all such
applications, as well as values for them: their goal (create
something or inform decision-making), their incentives (money
or love/glory), their staffing (crowd or some hierarchical struc-
ture), and their procedural operation, which depends on their
goal.
Hence, when creation is involved, the goal may involve
simple collection or tighter collaboration and synchronization
of individual contributions; whereas, when CI applications
enable decision-making, the decisions may be taken by in-
dividuals or only at group-level, and involve monetary or
non-monetary incentives. The authors acknowledge that this
categorization “provides a useful start for the much-to-be-done
work”.
Online collective systems are also considered by
Antin [19]. The focus is on the operational aspects of online
collaborative systems, and the desired mode of end user con-
tributions to each one of them. Hence, there are systems where
the diversity rather than size of contribution matters more. It
may be important that individuals indicate their membership
to a contribution group, even if they do not actively contribute
to the system.
Contrary to the previous work, Antin is not interested in
the complete taxonomy of such systems, but rather seeks to
identify which social-psychological incentives may apply to
each contribution mode, drawing hints for the design of related
user interface.
Finally, a less explicit classification is presented in the tech-
nical note of Ref. [1], presenting the concept of the collective
awareness platforms. The emphasis is here on their goals. The
possible missions of the platforms are supposed to go beyond
the abstraction of the create-decide tuple. Increasing self-
conscience, nudging towards environmental-friendly lifestyles,
enhancing democracy, and taming of complex scientific tasks
are identified as broad classifiers of CAPs at the mission level.
IV. PRIVACY, REPUTATION AND GAMIFICATION
Collective awareness platforms are fundamentally depen-
dent on grassroots participation and information sharing by
people. However, the information that a CAP requires for its
working may be sensitive by itself, or it could be used to infer
important pieces of information about users. People have a
right to privacy, and if their privacy is compromised, their trust
to the CAP can lower, so they cease contributing. Moreover,
news about privacy breaches will reach other users, possibly
causing a domino effect.
It follows that preserving the privacy of information that
users share is a necessary condition for the success, and
sustainability operation of CAPs. The tradeoff between privacy
and application utility has mostly been studied in the context
of publishing data in a database [20]. In this context, privacy is
equated with re-identifiability, rather than with e.g. the quantity
of data disclosed: The data is anonymized and the attacker tries
to link it to the user who produced it (i.e., re-identify the user).
Moreover, for the most part, privacy in data publishing
has not been studied with a specific application in mind, and
hence utility metrics could only be generic: for instance, an
anonymized database is useful if it preserves the average of
all entries, or, more strictly, if it preserves the distribution
of entries [21]. Only recently have specific privacy-utility
frameworks been proposed for concrete applications (smart
meters [22]). There, (negative) utility is measured as the
distortion between the true and the perturbed value of data.
It is common in ICT research to see clever applications,
which can in principle meet common needs, be developed but
never actually adopted. This problem is particularly evident
for those applications whose utility depends on the number
of users in a non-linear way. The problem can be better
understood from a game-theoretic perspective.
A game is defined in terms of possible actions, payoffs
and expected number of encounters. The players can adopt
strategies, which dictate how users respond to an opponent’s
actions given the history of their interactions, and there are
techniques to select the “best” strategies, depending on the
payoff, the possibility of committing errors, the number of ex-
pected re-encounters with the same opponent, or the possibility
of being observed by others. Considering for instance the clas-
sical prisoner’s dilemma, the “best” strategy can switch from
“always defecting” to “reciprocal collaborating” (tit-for-tat)
depending on the number of expected re-encounters; notably,
this approach suggests further ways to motivate collaborative
behaviour depending on mechanisms such as direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, reputation, group selection [23].
The “best” strategy can be deterministic or stochastic, and
there are also situations where the optimum is only transient:
in a competitive environment (such as in a market), where each
individual can encounter any other one, the overall optimum
depends on the type of the other strategies that are present, and
the success of one strategy may alter the scenario/situation, and
disrupt the very reasons for its success (similar to the “Red
Queen effect” in evolution [24]).
This scenario becomes even more complex when the payoff
itself depends on the number of strategies present in the
population. This is the case with applications or behaviours,
whose beneficial return depends on the number of adopters. For
instance, garbage separation or blood donation provide little
benefit (if any) to the adopter, but can boost a public return if
adopted massively. But this is not the whole story. The above
analysis is based on the hypothesis that the actor (decision-
agent) is “perfectly rational”; this is rather rarely the case
with real humans. They often act following “human heuristics”,
which have been selected for being useful in a social context,
have limited computational capabilities (bounded rationality),
and limited time; or they may be sometimes “irrational” from
the mathematical point of view [25], [26].
Humans communicate at several levels and their decisions
may depend on many “psychological” aspects that are difficult
to capture in a model. In particular, it is well known that the
social group has a strong effect on the resulting behaviour of
participants, so it is important to perform observations of group
dynamics and community structures, and relate them with user
profiles and communication strategies. Fortunately, since most
of communication happens today on digital channels, it is
possible to collect data and administer surveys in an automatic
way, and it is also possible to gather many data about virtual
group dynamics using a suitable computer interface.
The data gathering can be facilitated by making real people
participate to a simulation, for instance by presenting it as
a game (gamification of the problem). Interestingly, the very
problem of motivating the broad adoption of new practices had
been faced at the beginning of last century by Kurt Lewin and
the emerging school of Social Cognition [27], [28], [29]. The
question was then how to promote the usage of entrails in face
of a shortage of “standard meal” due to the 1929 crisis, since
this was clashing against the nutritional habits of Americans.
The methodology developed by Lewin was named action
research, and draws on two main overlapping phases: the first
about investigation and data collection (research), followed by
an active one in which researchers and subjects are involved
together on a peer ground (action), discussing and negotiating
on the social perception of the problem. This approach can
be translated in virtual terms (over social networks and chats),
which is an approach that is practically well consolidated and
is the basis of “viral marketing”, but has not yet been studied
systematically.
But even letting aside the complex mechanisms of human
decision-making, and sticking to the rational prescriptions of
economic theory, it is difficult to understand which market
models apply to such public goods. Should one try to evaluate
a price and a breakdown number of users, or should one
rely on additional services, or the “mass effect” of having
many participants? Should one rely on public support (and
how to evaluate which application is profitable)? How can
one measure the adoption and the penetration of a “free”
application?
It becomes, thus, compelling for platforms that engage
autonomous users and deliver a utility that depends on the
participant numbers and behaviours, to best address all those
dimensions that motivate human behaviour. One key aspect is
identifying those types of incentives, with reasonable levels of
segregation or even personalization, which engage humans into
mechanisms of active contribution and sharing of knowledge.
In parallel, the question of incentives has to be pursued for
all participating players, and entities that are directly (or indi-
rectly) involved in the platform, either as providers/operators,
or as open data providers, or as competition when a market
viewpoint is taken.
V. CAPS’ RELEVANT DIMENSIONS
The main problems that we are addressing are: is it possible
to classify CAPs using a small number of relevant axes (and
which these axes are), how these axes are related to the
cognitive characteristics addressed above, and how can we
model the interactions among caps and users in order to
develop a predictive tool to be used for assessing the status
of an application?
Within the activity of the Scicafe2.0 project [30], some
of us preliminary analysed 70 instances of CAPs, including
those funded by UE and others [31] and, based on that,
developed a survey that is currently administered to CAPs
coordinators [32]. We are designing a similar survey for
CAPs users in order to detect the perceived importance of the
relevant dimensions. The final goal is that of identifying the
relevant dimensions of CAPS like topic, cost, payoff, privacy,
reputation, community structure. Clearly, in this way we are
only looking for a static snapshot of the current situation.
The dynamical modelling problem is a more complex
task. It requires a simple model of an individual (using the
tri-partite system described above), the way in which users
interact and develop a community, how the payoff of the CAP
(including reputation, gaming etc.) is influenced by the user
number and community structure, and how CAPs compete
(or collaborate) among them. The previous classification can
be fundamental in order to limit the dimensionality of CAPs
and user characteristics. This activity is supported by task
FOCAL [33] of the UE project EINS [34].
Just to present some preliminary results, we found that
the main factor for the competition is how payoff (however
defined) depends on the number of users. An always-increasing
payoff would bring to the establishment of just one CAP (the
FaceBook effect), while CAPs that share a limited resource
(like parking assistance) determine the typical dimension of
the user community. Moreover, there is often a critical user
size below which the payoff (e.g., time required to actively
contribute to CAP), is negative. The main difficulty of “young”
CAPs is that of overcoming this breakthrough threshold.
Clearly, this analysis only applies to a given dimension, and
CAPs sometimes span over multiple dimensions (e.g., Google,
FaceBook, etc.). This multi-dimensional character may help
overcoming the initial threshold effect (for instance, by means
of the gamification of a sub-task, or by levering on strong
motivations [35]).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the previous elements, we are developing a CAPs
classification and modelling approach. We are presently de-
veloping models of individuals interacting by means of virtual
instruments (based on real experiments), and classifying CAPs
on a small number of relevant axes. We think that the actual
interplay of users and CAPs in a competitive/collaborative
scenario is a dynamical problem, that can better understood by
means of simulations. We therefore are developing an agent-
based model that takes into consideration the CAP character-
istics (as emerging from the survey) and users profiles. The
user participation to a given CAP is determined by the match
between the CAP characteristics (that may include “irrational”
elements), the expected gain vs. cost, and the influence of
privacy, reputation, and gaming components, according to the
cognitive model of users. Users also react to peer pressure,
modulated through the personal community structure. On the
other hand, CAPs compete for users’ resources (mainly time
and participation) and interact among them, also contributing
to the formation of users’ community structure. The way
the gain (payoff) and reputation components depend on user
participation couples the users dynamics to that of CAPs.
It is a complex scenario but we hope being able to identify
useful parameters to validate the model with static data (those
from the survey), possibly offering a way of assessing the
“health status” of a CAP using “passive” measurements, i.e.,
data gathered during the normal activity of the CAP, without
the need of directly contacting users and coordinators.
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